1952]

RECENT

CASES

ADmIRALTY-"BOTH TO BLAME" CLAUSES HEU INVALID-A cargo
carrying ship collided with a non-carrying ship in New York. Both ships
were damaged, as well as the cargo, and the owners of the cargo recovered
damages from the non-carrying ship. The shipowners filed cross-libels
in a United States District Court to recover for their respective damages.
The owners of the damaged cargo were impleaded. It was stipulated that
both vessels were negligent in their operation. The court entered an interlocutory decree settling the rights of the parties and holding the cargo
owners liable over to indemnify the owner of the carrying ship under a
"Both-to-Blame" contract clause.' The cargo owners appealed, alleging
that the clause was "invalid, illegal, contrary to the statutes of the United
States and contrary to public policy." The Court of Appeals, by 2-1
decision, held the clause invalid and reversed the decree in part. United
States v. ParrSugar Corp., 191 F.2d 370 (2nd Cir. 1951).
Under the American rules governing maritime damages, an anomalous
situation exists. A carrier is not liable to a cargo owner (shipper) for
any damages to the cargo resulting from the negligence of his servants
in the operation of the vessel. 2 But when two ships, both negligent, collide, the other ship is liable in full for all damages sustained by the shipper.3
Also, while the shipper has no right of action against the negligent carrier, each carrier has a right of action for negligence against the other.
Under the American rule of divided damages, each ship is liable for onehalf of the total damages. 4 In computing its damages, the non-carrying
ship may include the amount that it has paid the owners of the cargo
aboard the carrier ship. 5 These rules may be illustrated as follows: The
S. S. Carrier,bearing C's cargo, strays from its channel and runs aground
through the sole negligence of its pilot. C's cargo is damaged to the
extent of $100,000. C can collect nothing. But suppose that the S. S.'
Carrier collides with the S. S. Empty as a result of the negligence of
both pilots. Each ship sustains $500,000 damage, and C's cargo loss
is again $100,000. Empty must pay C $100,000, the full amount of the
loss, but may add that sum to its own damages, making them $600,000.
Under the rule of divided damages, Carrier must pay Empty $50,000.
Thus when the carrier is solely negligent, he is not liable for the cargo, but

1. 90 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
2. 49 STAT. 1210 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §1304 (1946).
3. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876); The New York, 175 U.S. 187 (1899).
4. The less damaged ship must pay the more damaged one one half the difference
between the two amounts of damage.
5. The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899); Erie Railroad Co. v. Erie &
Western Transportation Co., 204 U.S. 220 (1907).
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when he is partially negligent, he is "indirectly" liable for one-half the
amount of the cargo loss. This is the anomaly, to correct which is the
purpose of the "Both-to-Blame" clause. The clause provides that when
both ships are to blame, cargo owners will indemnify the carrier against
all liability to the other ship, in so far as such liability represents any
claim of the cargo owner paid by the other ship. 6 Thus, in the illustration,
C would be required to indemnify Carrierfor $50,000.
There is no language in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the controlling statute, which specifically authorizes or invalidates the "Bothto-Blame" clause.7 Judge Medina, who heard the case in the District
Court, was of the opinion that, since the Act relieves the carrier of all
direct liability to cargo owners for the negligent operation of his vessel,
there is no public policy against an agreement which absolves the carrier
from indirect liability to cargo owners. He relied strongly on a rule of
policy announced in The Jason s that parties may lawfully contract in
derogation of a common law rule provided that they adhere to standards
set by Congeess in analogous situations.
The Harter Act,9 the forerunner of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, was the first statute freeing carriers from liability to shippers for
negligent operation. Prior to it they were held strictly accountable for
all negligence.' 0 After the Harter Act, contract clauses which required
cargo owners to contribute for sacrifice and expenditures made in a successful effort by a carrier to save a negligently stranded vessel and her
cargo were for the first time upheld." Although it had been held that
the Harter Act did not itself change the law, 12 the Supreme Court in The
Jason case held such a clause valid on the ground that it was consistent
with the general policy of that Act.'3 In the instant situation, since the
"Both-to-Blame" clause was found consistent with the policy of the Harter
and Carrier of Goods Acts, this clause was not found to be against public
policy, in the District Court. The Court of Appeals was unwilling to
accept this analysis.
The Carriage of Goods Act, like its predecessor the Harter Act,
only regulates the relationship between carrier and shipper, not between
carrier and non-carrier or between non-carrier and shipper.' 4 Therefore
6. For the text of the clause, see KNAuT1, OcAN Bn.Ls OF LADING 95 (1947).
The clause has been in use in the North Atlantic Freight Conference since Sept. 1,
1937. RoBiNsoN, ADmALTY 872, 873 (1939).
7. Cf. § 3(8) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1946),
which counsel for the shippers contended invalidated the clause.
8. 225 U.S. 32 (1912).
9. 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. § 190 et seq. (1946).
10. Liverpool & G.W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1888).
The Folmina, 212 U.S. 354, 361 (1908).

See

11. The previous law was that a ship-owner had a right to enforce such contribution. Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386 (1894).
12. The Irawaddy, 171 U.S. 187 (1898).
13. The "Jason clause" is now recognized by the Carrier of Goods by Sea Act,
49 STAT. 1211 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1305 (1946).
14. The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459 (1895).
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the court would not allow the carriers, by use of the "Both-to-Blame"
clause, to interfere with these latter relations, which the Supreme Court
had established in The Atlas 5 and The Chattahoochee.16
The past history of the "Both-to-Blame" clause is not of great aid
in determining the correctness of the Court of Appeals holding. The
clause, in substance, is embodied in the Collision Convention of 1910,
and is the rule governing damages in almost every shipping nation of the
world.1 7 But although the convention remained pending before the Senate
for ten years, it was never ratified.' 8 On the other hand, the "Both-toBlame" clause was specifically before Congress prior to the passage of
the Carriage of Goods Act, but was neither included in the Act nor made
void. 19 The history of legislation affecting carriers' liability reflects a
running battle between carriers and shippers, with inevitable compromises
and ambiguities. 20 In the light of this past history, the court was undoubtedly justified in its cautious stand not to validate the clause.
Actually, whatever the final disposition of the "Both-to-Blame" clause
may be, no great harm or disruption to the ocean shipping business seems
in store. First, the situation in which the clause comes into play is apparently uncommon. Although the clause has been in universal use in
American bills of lading since 1937, this was the first time that a court
had occasion to test its validity. Second, ocean shippers and carriers are
always covered by insurance, and the result will merely be an adjustment
of insurance rates. 21 One other effect may follow if the decision stands.
Inasmuch as the law of the United States will then be different from the
law of other maritime nations, which gives the carrier complete immunity
from cargo owners whether solely or partially negligent in operation, there
may be increased efforts by the carriers to avoid being sued in this country,
or attempts by shippers to maintain suits here to take advantage of the
22
American rule.

CONTRACTS-RELIEF FOR UNILATERAL MISTAKE-CLAUSE PROHIBITING WITHDRAWAL OF CONTRACTOR'S BID ON AcCOUNT OF ERRoR-The
Board of Public Works of Los Angeles published a notice inviting bids for
a construction project. Each bid had to be accompanied by a certified
check or surety bond, and no bid could be withdrawn for three months.
15. See note 4 mipra.
16. See note 5 supra.
17. See KNAUTH, op. cit. s tpra note 6, at 175.
18. See 6 BENEDICT, ADmaLTY 3-4 (1941), and Supp. 3 (1951).
19. Hearings before Commnittee on Commerce oo S. 1152, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
51-59 (1935); Hearings before Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on
S. 1152, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-53 (1936).
20. For an excellent discussion of this legislative history, see KxAuTH, op. cd.
supra note 6, at 107-119.
21. Id. at 176.
22. Ibid.
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The notice stated that bidders "will not be released on account of errors."
Plaintiff's bid of $780,305 was the lowest. Several hours after the bids
were opened plaintiff discovered his bid had omitted an item estimated
at $301,769. He notified the Board of his error and attempted to withdraw his bid, but the Board accepted the bid, and upon plaintiff's refusal
to execute the written contract, without readvertising, awarded the contract to the next lowest bidder and demanded forfeiture of plaintiff's bond.
Plaintiff brought an action to cancel its bid and to obtain discharge of the
bond. Held, rescission granted. The clause providing that bidders "will
not be released on acbount of errors" is intended to include errors of
judgment such as underestimating cost of materials and not clerical errors
in tabulating figures. Kemper Construction Co. v. City of Los Angeles,

235 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1951).
While as a general rule relief for unilateral mistake will not be given
unless the mistake is "palpable," i.e., was known or should have been known
to the party seeking enforcement, rescission not conditioned on a finding
of "palpability" has been increasingly given in situations involving erroneous bids.- The bid is an irrevocable offer by the bidder, a contract
formed prior to the notice of mistake. 2 Analysis of the cases in which such
relief has been given shows that the minimum conditions demanded are
that the mistake was due to mechanical oversight, that there has been no
change of position by the other party preventing a substantial return to
the status quo, and that performance of the contract would result in
financial hardship to the mistaken party. 3 How substantial the hardship
must be to fulfill this last condition is uncertain. It does not appear from
the cases whether loss of estimated profits or performance at a relatively
slight loss would be sufficient to obtain relief. 4 The special position of
the erroneous bid cases would appear to be due to the fact that in the
majority of the cases the party seeking enforcement has not relied on the
contract to his detriment when the mistake is made known to him. The
error is generally discovered and reported by the contractor shortly after
the bids are opened. The presence of the other bidders generally makes
it possible to make other arrangements with a minimum of trouble and
no additional expense of time or money. In other situations, however, the
1. The cases are collected in 5 WILmsToN, CONTRAcrs § 1578, n.3, 5 (Rev. ed.
1937) ; 3 CoRBiN, CoNThACTs § 609, n.47 (1951) ; 80 A.L.R. 586 (1932) ; 107 A.L.R.
1451 (1937).
2. See CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §609, n.45 (1951).
3. St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, 135 Minn. 115, 160 N.W. 500 (1916); Nat.
Bank v. Anderson-Campbell Co., 256 Mich. 674, 240 N.W. 19 (1932) ; School District v. Olson Const. Co., 153 Neb. 451, 45 N.W.2d 164 (1950) ; Conduit & Foundation Corp. v. Atlantic City, 2 NJ. Super. 433, 64 A.2d 382 (1949).
4. Relief has been given where the percentage of the mistake as compared to
the amount bid has been as low as 7%. The percentage of the bid that the contractor had estimated as profit does not appear. St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, 135
Minn. 115, 160 N.W. 500 (1916); Nat. Bank v. Anderson-Campbell Co., 256 Mich.
674, 240 N.W. 19 (1932). No case has been found in which rescission has been
denied on the ground of insufficient estimated loss.
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party seeking enforcement has usually changed his position when the
mistake is discovered.5
Return to the status quo is not always possible in a bid situation, either
because other bids have been formally rejected and readvertisement is necessary, or because through lapse of time spent in investigating the bona
fides of an alleged mistake subsequent bids will be higher due to a price
rise. Since the present state of contract law allows only enforcement or
rescission, courts may ignore an insubstantial change in position and find
a return to the status quo possible when enforcement would work a forfeiture in excess of the loss to the non-mistaken party." The clause in
7
the present case is an attempt to insure the offeree against such losses,
and the decision indicates the difficulty of succeeding in such an attempt,
presumably because an effective clause would work the same forfeiture
sought to be avoided by the law. Assuming that such a clause could be
so worded as to amount to a relinquishment by a mistaken bidder of his
rights, justified on the ground that such was the bargain,8 a better solution
to the problem would be the availability of another remedy, i.e., grant
rescission, but condition it not only on the return to the non-mistaken
party of benefits received but also on compensation for his losses.9 Such
a sum should also include any expenses incidental to securing the desired
performance elsewhere. 10 Only when payment would not adequately compensate the non-mistaken party for his change in position should rescission
be denied.-" Such a solution would render unnecessary the frequently
unsuccessful attempts of a contracting party to shift the entire loss to the
other; more specifically it would obviate such narrow constructions of the
terms of a contract as in the instant case.
5. See Crane v. McCormick, 92 Cal. 202, 28 Pac. 223 (1891)

(rescission of real

estate agency contract denied where the agency had incurred advertising expenses

in reliance thereon) ; Wilson v. Investment Co., 129 Iowa 16, 105 N.W. 338 (1905)
(rescission of' sale of stock denied where the buyer had sold a house to a third person in reliance on the stock sale); Star-Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Evening Post, 256
Fed. 435 (2d Cir. 1919) (rescission of contract to provide famous war correspondent's
dispatches denied where paper had advertised heavily in reliance thereon). Since
in the usual case the mistaken party will have no opportunity to check the terms of
his offer against those of others, his error may well not become apparent until performance is due or has begun, after the lapse of considerable time. There may be
no available market in which the party seeking enforcement can readily obtain the
desired performance. The time, trouble, and money expended on the preliminary
negotiations with the mistaken party will have been for nothing. To grant rescission in such cases would not return the party to the status quo.
6. Kutche v. Ford, 222 Mich. 256, 192 N.W. 714 (1923) ; Martens & Co. v. City
of Syracuse, 171 N.Y. Supp. 87, 183 App. Div. 622 (1918).
7. Board of Regents v. Cole, 209 Ky. 761, 273 S.W. 508 (1928), contained a
similar clause ignored by the court.
8. See WiLLiSToN, CONTACrS § 1543, n.2 (Rev. ed. 1937).
9. See CoRB IN, Co NmAcTs § 599 (1951); Sharp, Notes on Contract Problems
and Comparative Law; 3 U. OF CHI. L. Rv. 277, 282-286 (1936).
10. The court adopted this position in Board of Regents v. Cole, 209 Ky. 761,
273 S.W. 508 (1928), conditioning rescission on payment to the non-mistaken party
of the costs of reletting the contract. The proposition advocated is contrary to
the objective theory of contracts. See CoRwI,
CoNraAcrs § 609 (1951), in which
it is maintained that certainty and stability in the formation of contracts should give
way before the solution here propounded in the erroneous bid situation,
11. See CoRBIN, CONTRACrS § 599 (1951).
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CRIMINAL LAw-EVIDENCE-ADmiSSIBILITY OF CONFESSION OF MURdefendant was
arrested on a charge of assault with intent to rape, for which he was committed and jailed the same day. He was later questioned in the United
States marshal's office about a murder committed six weeks earlier, and
three days later confessed to. that crime. He was subsequently charged with
murder and convicted, largely on the strength of his confession. The circuit
court reversed 1 on the ground, inter alia, that the admission in evidence of
2
the confession was error under the rule of McNabb v. United States.
DER OBTAINED DURING COMMITMENT FOR ASSAULT-The

Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds 3 but held
that the confession was admissible. United States v. Carignan, 72 Sup.
Ct. 97 (November 13, 1951).
It has long been the law that confessions obtained by coercion, threats,
or promises of reward are inadmissable in evidence under the Fifth Amendment. 4 The rule proved inadequate in cases where confessions were obtained by the police during periods of illegal detention of suspects, because
of the difficulty of proof of actual coercion. 5 To implement the rule and
to discourage illegal police practices the Supreme Court held, in McNabb
v. United States, that a confession obtained during a detention made illegal
by failure to bring a prisoner promptly before a committing magistrate is inadmissible without further proof of coercion. Subsequent disagreement as to
the purpose of the rule has led to several qualifications. The rule was thought
by some to be a judicial device to prevent illegal detentions by enforcing
observance of the commitment statutes. 6 As such the exclusion of confessions was directed only incidentally at enforcement of the Fifth Amendment, and exemplified the far more comprehensive purpose of judicial control of police methods. Recent lower court decisions have, however, dis7
carded this aim in favor of supplementing the Fifth Amendment only. If
immediate commitment is not feasible due to the unavailability of a magistrate, detention has been held not illegal and a confession obtained during
the interim is admissible.8 Moreover confessions obtained during a "real.Carignan v. United States, 185 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1951).
2. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
3. Affirmance was based on the error of the trial court in refusing to permit
the accused to testify in the absence of the jury to facts believed to indicate the
involuntary character of the confession.
4. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 237 (1941); Brain v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) ; Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. '613, 622, 623
(1896).
5. The importance of this problem was accentuated because the use of coercion
in obtaining confessions was found to occur most frequently during detentions made
illegal by violation of the commitment statutes. See Frankel, From Suspicionr to
Accusations, 51 YALE L.J. 748, 757 (1942).
6. McNabb v. United States, supra note 2, at 340.

It is immaterial whether

or not the confession was obtained by physical or psychological pressure; the illegal
detention alone is enough. Upshaw v. United States, 355 U.S. 410, 413 (1948).
See also Note, 47 CoL L. Rav. 1214, 1215 (1947).
7. See Note, 47 COL. L. RTv. 1214, 1216 (1947).
8. Garner v. United States, 174 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1949), 48 MIcH. L. REv.

1028 (1950).
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sonable time" after arrest have been held admissible even though the prisoner was not thereafter brought before a magistrate, on the grounds that the
illegal detention did not induce the confession, and there could have been no
coercion, psychological or otherwise.9 The Supreme Court itself has acquiesced in this change. 10 It has recently been held that if the arresting
authorities can prove reasonable necessity for a delay in arraignment a confession will not be excluded without proof of actual coercion. 1
Many have considered these subsequent cases a gradual emasculation
of the McNabb rule, indicating a continuing reconsideration by the Court
of its own earlier pronouncement. 12 Behind such a retreat lie the complaints of law enforcement bodies that the goal of apprehending criminals
is made unnecessarily difficult by this attempt to protect the innocent. 13 On
a less practical level it has been thought an unwarranted extension of power
for courts to seek police obedience to the commitment statutes in lieu of
legislative action, especially by using a rule of evidence to do so. The
answer to such objections has lain in the realization that undesirable police
investigative practices are not only prevalent but dangerous, and that the
lack of any really effective sanctions requires the courts to take whatever
steps they can. Under this view it is claimed that recent restrictions on the
rule in effect will cut the heart out of it; even as a supplement to the Fifth
Amendment only, the rule may add nothing to that Amendment because
the test of "detention inducing confession" may be little more than the old
test of whether a confession could be proved involuntary.' 4 Such a prediction seems unduly pessimistic; most of the recent restrictions are directed
at the removal of specific obstacles to effective law enforcement in situations
where there was little or no evidence of an atmosphere likely to be coercive.
There seems no question that a confession made under such suspicious
circumstances that indicate the use of psychological pressure at least will
be excluded, whether or not actual coercion can be proved.
It is difficult to see the applicability of the McNabb rule to the facts
of the instant case. Even if the rule is considered in the light of the broadest
purpose yet attributed to it, i.e., to enforce strictly the commitment statutes,
it would have no application here since those statutes were obeyed. There
may have been, as the majority suggests,' 5 a violation of the rule since the
questioning was apropos of a crime other than that for which Carignan had
been committed, but such a violation is purely technical. Having been com9. United States v. Klee, 50 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
10. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
11. Haines v. United States, 188 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1951), 100 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 136 (1951).
12. See Note, 47 CoL L. REv. 1214, 1219-20 (1947); Comment, 48 MicH. L.'
Rnv. 1028, 1030 (1950).
13. This viewpoint was expressed in the Hobbs Bill, H.R. 3690, 78th Congress,
1st Session (1943). See Note, 53 YAIx L.J. 758, 766 (1944).
14. This opinion was expressed in Note, 53 YALE L.J. 758, 764-765 (1944),
referring to Sykes v. United States, 143 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
15. Instant case at 102, although such a suggestion is not clear from the Court's
language.
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mitted, he had achieved all the protection that the commitment statutes
afford, namely the availability of counsel, family, and friends, as well as the
protection of the jailer. He was in no different a position than he would
have been if he had been committed for murder. There is no doubt that in
such a situation it is still possible for him to be subjected to the third degree,
but it has never been suggested that the McNabb rule is so broad as to
exclude all confessions obtained through any violation of any law.' 6 Enforcement of the commitment statutes alone was the goal. This does not
necessarily prevent the creation of new rules to enforce other illegal police
practices, for instance the failure of a warden or jailer to protect prisoners
from police brutality. The Court here did not advert to the fact that
Carignan was removed from jail and questioned in the marshal's office, but
it would not seem amiss to create a new rule of evidence to exclude confessions so obtained. Such a rule would serve to discourage the practice
of arresting and committing a man for vagrancy or some other minor crime,
and then gaining the consent of the jailer to remove the prisoner for a secret
inquisition elsewhere.' 7 Since the same dangers exist here as where the
commitment statutes have been violated, a rule similar to McNabb might
be desirable. But one cannot quarrel with the Court for its failure to apply
the McNabb rule itself to cover a situation beyond its purpose.

CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-PRIvILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION MAY NoT BE ASSERTED IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITE A

PREVIOUSLY ASSUiED DuTY-When four of the defendants in United
States v. Dennis' failed to surrender to commence serving their term of
imprisonment, the district court directed the appearance before it of the
trustees and officers of the Bail Fund of the Civil Rights Congress of New
York which had acted as surety for the fugitives. Asserting that their
disclosures would tend to incriminate them, 2 the trustees refused to produce
the books and records of the Bail Fund, or to answer questions pertaining
both to the source of the fund posted as bail and to the whereabouts of
16. Such, however, is the gist of the argument of the concurring opinion,
instant case at 102-103. Justice Douglas saw the facts of the case to be an example
of the "time-honored police method for obtaining confessions" of arresting a man on
one charge, "often a minor one", and using his detention for investigating a different
one. Viewing this device as little more than a means of avoiding the McNabb rule's
strict language, while perpetrating the same evils the rule seeks to avoid, he thought
the rule applicable.
17. The instant case presents little evidence of actual coercion, although the
Court notes that the uncontroverted evidence includes the facts that Carignan was
closeted with a priest for several hours, and that religious pictures hung on the
walls of the marshal's office. Whether Carignan contended this was psychological
pressure is not clear, but is doubtful since the priest was called at Carignan's re-

quest. Instant case at 99.

1. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
2. There was a possibility of incrimination under either the Smith Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2385 (1946), or under 18 U.S.C. § 1071 (1946) which makes a crime the
"harboring or concealing" of a person for whom a -warrant has been issued.
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the fugitives. The court ruled that the answers to these questions were
not privileged, but the trustees persisted in their refusal to answer and were
sentenced for contempt. On appeal the circuit cour affirmed on two
grounds. First, the trustees held the books and records in a representative
capacity and therefore could not invoke the privilege even though production of the papers might tend to incriminate them.8 Second, invoking the
privilege was inconsistent with the obligation to produce the principals
which the trustees assumed when they posted bail for the fugitives. United
States v. Field, et al., 2d Cir., Oct. 30, 1951. cert. denied, 20 U.S.L. Week
4
3137 (U.S. 1951).
Bail arose in England as a procedure whereby a prisoner, as an alternative to being jailed, was placed in the custody of a friend who assumed
the obligation of producing the prisoner when a court required his presence.5
Prior to the instant case the federal courts have utilized the theory that
the surety was the prisoner's personal jailor, and concluded that the
obligation of the surety was not limited to his financial commitment. For
example, the courts have refused to accept bail from a surety when it
appears that he has indemnified himself from financial loss and therefore
has no incentive to watch over the principal or to apprehend him if he
contemplates flight." Also, where the principal has failed to appear when
ordered by the court, the surety is not subrogated to the government's
preferred position to collect from the principal, because this would induce
the surety to neglect his obligation to exert himself in securing the appearance of the principal. 7 Assuming that the trustees in the instant case
had a personal duty to deliver up the defendants in the Dennis case, it
is clear that this duty was breached if the trustees concealed the fugitives
or aided in their flight. Likewise, refusing to answer questions which
would aid in the arrest of the fugitives was inconsistent with this duty.
The question of the effect of duty upon the privilege against self-incrimination has arisen in a number of situations. The one most analogous to
the instant case is the right of a police officer to refuse, on the ground that
his answers would tend to incriminate him, to divulge crimes known to
3. This is a well-known rule of law. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694
(1944) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
4. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas were of the opinion that certiorari
should be granted.

5. The term was defined by Blackstone as "a delivery, or bailment, of a person
to his sureties, upon their giving (together with himself) sufficient security for his
appearance; he being supposed to continue in their friendly custody instead of going
to gaol." 4 BL Comm. *297.
6. United States v. Caliguiri, 35 F. Supp. 799 (D.C. N.J. 1940) ; United States
v. Lee, 170 Fed. 613 (S.D. Ohio 1909); United States v. Simmons, 47 Fed. 575

(C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1891).

But cf. Leary v. United States, 224 U.S. 567 (1912) in

which Mr. Justice Holmes held that a contract to indemnify the surety was not
against public policy because the concept that the surety had a personal obligation
to produce the principal is based only on tradition and is contrary to present day

realities. In the instant case the court said that this decision could not "be held to
overturn the long' and settled line of cases to which we have referred."
7. United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729 (1884).
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him. There the courts have held that the officer may assert his privilege
although to do so is inconsistent with his duty. The penalty for conduct
unbecoming an officer is loss of his job, not loss of his privilege.8 Similarly, when an agent violates his fiduciary duty by embezzlement, the
courts have held that his duty to perform faithfully and to render an account will not take away the privilege." On the other hand, the federal
courts have utilized the concept of duty to carve out one of the best-known
exceptions to the privilege, namely the rule which prohibits a corporate
officer from invoking the privilege when ordered to produce corporate
books and records, even though these papers contain evidence which would
incriminate him. 10 The Supreme Court had held in Hale v. Henkel"
that the privilege could not be asserted on behalf of a corporation, and to
enforce this ruling further held, in Wilson v. United States,12 that the custodian of the books of a corporation could not claim his personal privilege,
on the ground that he had voluntarily assumed a duty which overrode his
claim of privilege. 18
Whenever one asserts his privilege not to answer he thereby deprives
the government of its sovereign right to his testimony. Thus whenever
the privilege is claimed the court must balance the value of the privilege
in the particular situation against the detriment to the public incident to
the withholding of information. To determine which interest is paramount
is often difficult, and in the words of Chief Justice Marshall these conflicting interests both must "be preserved to a reasonable extent."' 4 The
history of the privilege over the last fifty years has been a process of
whittling away at the flat Constitutional prohibition that no one "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 15 If
this process of judicial contraction continues, the instant decision has great
significance as a potential precedent, because everyone who asserts the
privilege to protect himself from revealing a crime which he has corn8. Christal v. Police Commissioner, 33 Cal.App.2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939);
ef. Drury v. Hurley, 402 Ill. 243, 83 N.E.2d 575 (1949) ; Canteline v. McClelland,
282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972 (1940). The latter case involved the construction of
Art. I, § 6 of the New York Constitution which provides that no person shall "be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, provided, that any
public officer who, upon being called before a grand, jury to testify concerning the
conduct of his office or the performance of his official duties, refuses to sign a waiver
of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, or to answer any relevant
questions concerning such matters before such grand jury, shall be removed from
office . . ."
9. In re Berman, 105 Cal. App. 37, 287 Pac. 125 (1930) ; Vineland v. Maretti,
93 N.J. Eq. 513, 519, 117 Atl. 483, 486 (1922); Warren v. Holbrook, 95 Mich. 185,
189, 54 N.W. 712, 713 (1893).
10. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) ; Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1910).
11. 201 U.S. 43 (1905).
12. 221 U.S. 361 (1910).
13. Id. at 380.
14. United States v. Burr (In re Willie), 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,682 at 39 (C.C.
Va. 1807).
15. U.S. CoNsT.-AMEND. V.
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mitted, has a fortiori breached some duty owed to the public. Even though

the majority in the instant case expressly states that the duty assumed
must be greater than the general burden of good citizenship or due performance of an accepted office, 16 it is not difficult to imagine that every
case might be said to arise out of a duty greater than good citizenship. In
fact, in view of the prevalence of commercial bondsmen today, the duty
which the trustees were held to have undertaken in the instant case was

little more than a legal fiction. Perhaps the most obvious utilization of
the rationale of the instant case would be a holding that no government

employee may refuse to answer any questions concerning his activity in,
or association with, any organization which advocates the overthrow of the
government by force or violence.

EMINENT DOMAIN-JUST

COMPENSATION-GovERNMENT

OF STRUCK COAL MINES A COMPENSABLE

SEIZURE

TAKING-Pewee Coal Company

was one of many bituminous coal mine owners encountering labor difficulties in midspring, 1943. After a full scale work stoppage by the
miners, the President of the United States issued an order authorizing and
directing the Secretary of the Interior "to take immediate possession so
far as may be necessary or desirable" of the struck mines.' The Secretary accordingly issued an "Order for Taking Possession" 2 and designated the chief executive officers of the mines "operating managers" for
the government. Their duties consisted of normal managerial functions
plus responsibility to the government for continued production. While
the mines were still under seizure the War Labor Board recommended payment of certain wage adjustments to the miners, which the operating
managers were ordered to meet by the Secretary. Pursuant to this directive, Pewee made payments of $2,423.86 to its employees. During the
period of government seizure Pewee suffered an overall operating deficit
of approximately $36,000. It subsequently brought suit for this larger
amount in the Court of Claims, alleging that the government seizure of
its mine was a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. 8 The
Court of Claims held that the government was liable for the wage adjustments which the company was ordered to make, but not for the balance
of the loss suffered. 4 On certiorari to the Supreme Court a majority of
the Court affirmed the judgment, although no majority was able to concur
in one opinion. Justice Black, speaking for himself and three other
16. Instant case.
1. Exec. Order No. 9340, 8 FED. RE. 5695 (1943).
2. 8 FED. REG. 5767 (1943). Approximately 2,850 mines were seized under this

order. They accounted for about 959 of the nation's bituminous coal production.

3. U.S. CowsT. Amam. V: "...
nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation."
4. Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
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Justices, 5 took the position that the government must bear all losses in
the period during which property is seized and operated without the
owners consent.6 Justice Reed was of the opinion that only losses due to
direct governmental action are compensable. United States v. Pewee Coal
Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951). 7
Before the Court could decide what principle should govern in the
award of compensation, it had first to determine whether the government
action actually constituted a taking within the scope of the Fifth Amendment. Generally, governmental control which exceeds permissible powers
of regulation is the criterion. 8 This necessarily vague standard as applied
in the instant case meant an excessive invasion of managerial prerogative
attaching to ownership of property. Federal regulation of the coal mines,
much of which was similar to that exercised in this seizure, had earlier been
approved by the Court 9 in unholding the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.10
In addition, control of wages has also been upheld as a permissible regulation." But although the Court has affirmed the validity of the component
parts of the regulation involved here, the scope of control possible under
the Presidential order of seizure could encompass complete authority over
the appropriated property even to the extent of assuming all directorial
responsibility. To this extent, the seizure here resembled seizures made
under the War Labor Disputes Act. 12 That act was interpreted by the
8
Court in United States v. United Mine Workers of America'1
as vesting
in the government the equivalent of full ownership of property taken by
its authority, and the Court felt bound by the UMW decision to hold
a compensable taking existed here.
The failure of a majority of the Court to decide what principle should
govern the measure of compensation, once a taking was found to exist,
is a reflection of the dilemma that has beset the Court in recent years.
Wartime brought a rapid increase in the number of government appropriations of private property,' 4 particularly temporary takings.' 5 The
customary formula for determining compensation for a temporary taking
5. Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson concurred.
6. He did not feel constrained to consider whether the government was liable
for the balance of the $36,000 loss inasmuch as Pewee failed to seek review. Instant case at 118.
7. Justices Burton, Clark, Minton, and Chief Justice Vinson dissented on the
grounds that the record failed to show any loss to Pewee.
8. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 290 U.S. 393 (1922).
9. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
10. 50 STAT. 72 (1937), expired by 57 STAT. 82 (1943), 26 U.S.C. § 3520 (1946).
11. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
12. 57 STAT. 163 (1943), 50 U.S.C. § 1501 (1946), repealed by 62 STAT. 862
(1948), 50 U.S.C. § 1509 (Supp. 1951).

13. 330 U.S. 258 (1946).
14. In the three year period 1940-43, government appropriation of private
property increased 290%. Just, Condemnatio= Procedure During World War II,
12 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 286 (1944).
15. See Annotation, 7 A.L.R.2d 1297 (1949).
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is the fair rental value of the property seized, 1' but the Court has not been
able to determine, to the satisfaction of all its members, what elements
comprise that value. The instant case presented a unique situation, in
that corporate control and operation continued even after seizure. The fair
rental yardstick has been applied in such a context, 17 but has been criticized
as too rigid a rule for the settling of labor disputes.' 8 If fair rental value
means value as of the time of seizure, then the rental value of an inoperative concern would not be an adequate reflection of its actual worth
since operation will resume upon government seizure. If fair rental value
is construed to be the value of the business as a going concern, then managerial recalcitrance in labor disputes may be encouraged since management
will stand to lose nothing in the event of government seizure.
The instant case is the first to suggest another standard for determining compensation. Two views are advanced: by justice Black that the
government shall bear all losses, since it assumes by seizure the managerial
functions of the business; by justice Reed that the government shall pay
all losses due directly to its control, here the expenditures made in meeting
the WLB order which had no legal sanction. 19 The inadequacies of the
fair rental value formula show the balance in which both solutions must be
weighed: the effects of governmental control on the labor-management relationship and on normal operation of the seized business. Thus weighed,
Justice Black's solution appears deficient. The government is not really
an entrepreneur in this situation, taking all chance of profit and loss "like
any other person or corporation," as the Black opinion suggests.20 Rather,
it leaves all control in the owners except such as will insure the achievement of a specific policy purpose, continued operation. The business risk
remains with management, whose own operation will largely determine the
state of the balance sheet. In addition, this view may encourage ungrounded opposition by management to labor negotiations since government operation will insure the owners against loss. A theory that takes
into account the benefits which may accrue, eitlher through reduction or
elimination of expected losses, 21 is needed since a compensable taking is not
16. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
17. Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co., 186 Va. 481, 43 S.E.2d 10 (1947).
In Ken-Rad Tube and Lamp Corp. v. Badeau, 55 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Ky. 1944),
the court, while refusing to enjoin enforcement of a WLB decision, recognized that
a problem of compensation was presented but left the issue open for later determination.
18. See 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 280 (1947).
19. Action by the WLB never rose above the level of recommendation and could
not be enforced. See Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 60 HAv. L.
REv. 1017, 1026-1029 (1947). However, the War Labor Disputes Act authorized
the WLB to change terms of employment, if necessary, after seizure. 57 STAT. 165
(1943), 50 U.S.C. § 1504 (1946). This, however, clarified procedure without explaining the source of the power. Teller, op. cit. mtpra, at 1029.
20. Instant case at 117.
21. In Wheelock Bros. Inc. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 278 (Ct. Cl. 1950), a
finding was made that government seizure reduced expected losses. The case was
dismissed for jurisdictional reasons in 341 U.S. 319 (1951).
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to be implied where there is no proof of loss. 2 2 Justice Reed's theory of
direct loss, it is submitted, might well be interpreted in this light. Before
the government is required to meet the cost of its control, the benefits
flowing therefrom would be evaluated and set off.23 To do so would make
governmental seizure in labor disputes a potent but fair device to assure
continued production in vital industries without throwing into imbalance
other relationships which are equally important objects of governmental
concern.

INTERNATIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF AN EXILED DE JuPE GOVERNMENT
TO LEGISLATE FOR ITS TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY A DE FACTO GOVERNMENT-As a result of the German blitzkrieg of 1939 and 1940, the governments of Europe fled to London, where governments in exile were established to assist the Allies in the prosecution of the war. These governments,
including the Netherlands, were recognized by the United States and other
Allied countries as the de jure governments of the occupied countries. One
of the first official acts of the Netherlands Government in Exile was to issue
on May 24, 1940, Royal Decree A-1 which purported to vest title to all
claims of Netherland domiciliaries in the exiled government.' But by a
series of edicts, beginning on May 18 of the same year the German invaders
purported to vest these same titles in subsidiaries of the Nazi Government.2
As a result of the latter edicts, four bearer bonds of United States corporations were seized in the Netherlands and confiscated by the Germans. The
bonds were eventually found in the Swiss black markets where they were
purchased in 1947 by an American citizen, Verdun Archimedes. When
Archimedes returned to the United States the bonds were seized by the
22. Marion & Rye Valley Ry. v. United States, 270 U.S. 280 (1926); NevadaCalifornia-Oregon Ry. v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 75 (1928).
23. Cf. Bauman v. Ross 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
1. The Decree provided, in part: "1. Title to claims against persons, partnerships, companies, corporations, firms, institutions and public bodies, which claims
belong to natural or legal persons domiciled in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, . . .
in so far as these claims are in any form whatsoever capable of being encumbered,
pledged, transferred or sold or the like, outside of the Realm in Europe, is hereby
vested in the State of the Netherlands, as represented by the Royal Netherlands
Government, temporarily resident in London and exercising its functions there ...
3. The proprietary rights vested in the State of the Netherlands, by virtue of the
provisions of the preceding paragraphs, shall only be exercised for the conservation
of the rights of the former owners." Instant case at 659.
The authority of an absent government, constitutionally to legislate for its nationals while in exile, is discussed in Oppenheimer, Govermnents and Authorities
in Exile, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 568, 578, 581-582 (1942).
2. On May 18, 1940, authority over the occupied Netherlands was placed in the
hands of a Reichkommisar with the prerogative to legislate by personal ordinance.
On June 24 the Reichkommissar appointed administrators of property under enemy
control and on March 12 of the following year he suspended all owership of Jewish
enterprises. In August of 1941 the Reichkommissar compelled Jewish residents to
"deposit" all negotiable assets with his fiscal agent. In November of 1942 all accounts were merged and no further records were kept. Instant case at 658.
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United States and were delivered to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.3 The Netherlands then brought a replevin action for the bonds,
claiming title to them by virtue of Decree A-1. The bank interpleaded
Archimedes who also claimed the bonds. The Federal District court held
that neither the Netherlands nor Archimedes had valid title, and returned
the bonds to the bank to await the claim of the true owner. State of the
Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank et al., 99 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
It is well settled in international law that an ousted government remains the de jure government as long as it enjoys continuing recognition,
and that the belligerent occupant becomes the de facto government of the
occupied territory.4 However, the occupant's authority as the de facto
government is limited strictly to the confines of the occupied territory 5 and
does not extend to the assets of that nation abroad.6 The remainder of
governmental authority resides in the de jure government. As a result
the absent government acts consistently with its status 7 in passing legislation concerning its nationals or assets outside the occupied territory, although enforcement of such legislation is dependent upon a finding by the
enforcing tribunal that the legislation is not contrary to the public policy
of the forum.8 For example, the New York Court of Appeals enforced
Netherlands Decree A-1 in Anderson v. NV. Transandine Handelinaatschappij.9 In that case a non-resident alien sought to attach assets
of a Netherlands corporation which owned property located in New York.
The state of Netherlands intervened, asserting title to the property in itself
3. The bonds were seized and deposited under the Trading with the Enemy
Act, 40 STAT. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. A,. § 1 et seq. (1946) and
general rulings pursuant thereto. Section 5(b) of the Act provides: "(1) During
the time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the
President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, . . . (B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any acquisition
holding, . . . transfer, . . . or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privi-

lege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign
country or national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. . . ." The President
designated the Secretary of the Treasury to effectuate the Act. The Secretary
authorized seizure of such property and provided for deposit thereof in the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. 8 CODE FED. REGS. § 511.205 (1949). The principal
purposes of the Act were to prevent the Nazi occupants from profiting from seizure
of American securities abroad from which dollar exchange could be obtained for the
Axis power, and to protect nationals of occupied countries from being dispossessed
of title to their property. Instant case at 663.
4. See Oppenheimer, mtpra note 1, at 571-2; Wolff, The International Position
of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England, 6 MoD. L. REv. 208, 215 (1943) ;
6 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 358, 391 (1943); Art. 43, Annex
to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, 36 STAT. 2277, 2306 (1909).

5. See
cUPATION

FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMic LAW

OF BELUGERENT OC-

131-132 (1942) ; Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 571; Wolff, mpra note 4,

at 215.

6. See

FEILCHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 131-132.
7. See note 1 supra.
8. See Stein, Application of the Law of the Absent Sovereign in Territory umder
Belligerent Occupation, 46 MicH..L. REv. 341, 361-363, 369-370 (1948).

9. 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942).

766

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

by virtue of the decree. The court held that the decree validly vested title
to the assets in the Royal Government, so that the property could not be
attached by the creditors of the Netherlands corporation." Under AngloAmerican," German, 12 and probably the Belgian 13 theories of international
law, legislation of the absent sovereign has no effect whatever in the occupied
territory unless the occupant chooses to enforce it. As the bonds in the
instant case were located in the occupied territory, the court found that the
Netherlands decree did not affect them. Archimedes, too, was held to
have acquired no valid title by virtue of his purchase of the bonds in
Switzerland. 4
Although the courts of some countries might give more effect to legislation of an absent sovereign, the result reached in the instant case would
be duplicated in the vast majority of jurisdictions. In this particular case,
10. In deciding this case, the New York court had the benefit of a letter from
the United States Secretary of State, presented by the Attorney General, which asserted the policy of the United States as favorable toward the enforcement of the
Netherlands Decree. Id. at 19, 43 N.E.2d at 506. Thus the court was made aware
of the fact that the Decree in question was not contrary to the public policy of the
United States. A similar result has been reached in England where a decree of the
exiled Norwegian Government purporting to vest title of absent ships in the Norwegian Sovereign was enforced. Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co., [1942] 2 K.B. 202.
It is important to note that in each of these cases the situs of the asset was outside
the occupied territory. Also, both cases were decided during the course of World
War II.
11. United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246 (U.S. 1819) (United States tariff laws.
did not apply in United States territory occupied by a belligerent). See also 3
HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED

STATES 1886 (2d ed. 1945), and Stein, supra note 8, at 351-355.
12. Stein, supra note 8, at 355-358.
13. Id. at 358-360. The Belgian authorities are prone to give more effect to the
legislation of the absent sovereign for the occupied territory. However, this is an
outgrowth of Belgian tribunals passing on the effect of such legislation after the
de jure government had been restored to complete authority at the completion of
hostilities. ibid. But even the Belgian doctrine apparently rec6gnized that the same
effect would not follow where hostile measures were taken to combat the occupying
enemy. Id. at 360. The Netherlands seems to have accepted the Belgian theory
with this modification. FEILcHENFELD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 141. The German
doctrine is stronger than the Anglo-American view in that the Germans would give
the occupant almost unlimited authority over the occupied territory; Belgium on the
other hand, has tried to limit that authority severely. The suggested explanation
for the divergence is that Germany heretofore was customarily the occupant and
Belgium the occupied. Stein, supra note 8 at 360-361.
14. The bonds were seized under the authority of the provisions set forth in note
3 supra. Archimedes was held to have acquired no interest therein under the following order pursuant to § 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act:
"Section 1. All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise; if . . . (ii) such transactions involve propertyin which any foreign country, . . . or any natonal thereof, has at any time on or
since the effective date of this order had any interest of any nature whatsoever,
direct or indirect; . . . E. All transfers, withdrawals, or exportations of, or dealings in, any evidences of indebtedness or evidences of ownership of property by anyperson within the United States; and F. Any transaction for the purpose of which:
has the effect of evading or avoiding the foregoing prohibitions." Executive Order
No. 8389, 5 FED. REG. 1400 (1940), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §95a, note (1946).
Archimedes was held to have violated § 1(F) of the order. Further, he was heldt
not to have been a holder in due course under the provisions of New York law,

N.Y.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

lands and Switzerland.

LAW

§ 91, nor under similar laws of the Nether-

Instant case at 669.
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however, the result gives rise to some practical difficulties. There was
evidence in the case that the bona fide owners were Jewish, and because of
the Nazi pogroms it is improbable that the original owners or their heirs
will ever appear to press their claims.' 5 If they do, under such circumstances the Netherlands government would appear to be the agency best
able to pass on who the true owners are. Faced with this realization the
court might well have felt inclined to award the bonds to the Netherlands.
That they refused to do so, pursuant to doctrine, emphasizes the need for
some type of international agreement under which such property can be
awarded to the rightful owner, instead of being detained in a banker's limbo
subject to a possible escheat,' 6 in a country far removed from that where
the true owner will probably be found. 17 In the light of the possible recurrence of this type of litigation, due to the vast amount of property confiscated by the Germans, the instant court might well have applied doctrine
less rigidly and sought a more realistic solution.

Acr-Defendant was
charged with the breach of certain stipulations embodied in contracts entered into with the United States pursuant to the Walsh-Healy Act.' The
alleged breaches consisted of the failure to pay proper overtime wages to
numerous employees, and the employment of persons whose age fell below
the minimum required by the Act. The hearing examiner appointed by the
Secretary of Labor found the evidence to be sufficient to sustain the charges
and found the defendant liable for liquidated damages of $6,796.90.2 On
LIMITATION

OF

ACTIONS-WALSH-HEALY

15. Instant case at 658.
16. A state may provide for the escheat of unclaimed deposits in state banks,
Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923), but it cannot so provide
for funds deposited in a national bank, First Nat'l Bank of San Jose v. California,
262 U.S. 366 (1922). Thus the state would never obtain the proceeds of the bonds
in question. Under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, stpra note
3, the Federal Reserve Bank served only as a depository of the Secretary of the
Hence the ultimate
Treasury in this matter. 8 CoDE FED. Rt~s. §511.205 (1949).
disposition of the bonds must apparently await the application of a true claimant
or some disposition by the Treasury Department.
17. Compare the remedy awarded in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1941), 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 741 (1942), and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
Both cases involved the Roosevelt-Litvinov Assignment, which as324 (1937).
signed to the United States certain claims which the Russian Government acquired
by virtue of its nationalization decrees of 1919. The court's decisions recognized
the validity of the title which the Russian Government acquired by the decrees in
addition to recognizing the effective transfer of those claims to the United States.
1. The Wash-Healy Act requires that certain stipulations shall be included in
any contract entered into with the United States for the furnishing of supplies in
any amount exceeding $10,000. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1940), as
amended, 56 STAT. 277 (1942), 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1946).
2. Any breach of the stipulations in any such contract renders the party responsible liable to the United States for liquidated damages. 49 STAT. 2037 (1936),

41 U.S.C. § 36 (1946).
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December 28, 1949 suit was filed in the United States District Court to
enforce payment of the liquidated damages. Defendant moved for summary
judgment on the ground that, as the last contract between the parties
was completed in 1945, the suit was barred by the two year limitation
4
3
period contained in the Portal-to-Portal Act. The motion was granted.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the government's causes of
action accrued at the time of the under-payments and the hiring of underage
workers. United States v. Lovknit Manufacturing Company, 189 F.2d
454 (5th Cir. 1951).
Prior decisions under the Walsh-Healy Act considered administrative
proceedings under the auspices of the Secretary of Labor a prerequisite
to any right of action in the courts. 5 The government's cause of action
accrued and the limitation period commenced to run upon the determination
of the administrative proceedings. 6 This view allowed the government to
delay indefinitely notice to the contractor that a claim existed. A party
could be called upon to resist a claim for which ". . . evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." 7 The court
in the instant case held that a hearing and findings were not prerequisite
to a right of action in the courts; 8 therefore the causes of action accrued
and the limitation period commenced to run at the time the alleged defaults
occurred. 9 No longer could the government postpone indefinitely the
filing of its claim. But this result was reached by a strained construction
of the act, and its practical wisdom is doubtful. While there is no specific
prohibition against bringing a suit of this nature until after a hearing, the
statute itself provides for such hearings, and directs that the Secretary
of Labor shall make findings of fact after notice and hearing, ". ..
which
findings . . . if supported by the preponderance of the evidence, shall
be conclusive in any court of the United States. ..
. ," 10 Aware of the
3. The limitation period for suits under the Walsh-Healy Act is contained in
the Portal-to-Portal Act, which provides that any ". . . such action shall be forever
barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued." 61
STAT. 87 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §255a (Supp. 1950).
4. United States v. Lovknit Manufacturing Co., 90 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Tex.
1950).
5. See United States v. Lance, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 327, 329 (W.D. N.C.), rev'd,
190 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Sweet Briar, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 777,
782 (W.D. S.C. 1950); United States v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 84 F. Supp.
842, 846 (W.D. Va.), aff'd on other grounds, 178 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1949).
6. See note 5 supra; United States v. Hudgins-Dize Co., 83 F. Supp. 593 (E.D.
Va. 1949); United States v. Harp, 80 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Okla. 1948), aff'd on
other grounds, 173 F.2d 761 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949). Contra:
United States v. Unexcelled Chemical Corp., 99 F. Supp. 155 (N.J. 1951) (decided
since the instant case).
7. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.
342, 349 (1944).
8. Instant case at 459.
9. Ibid.
10. 49 STAT. 2038 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 39 (1946).
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great number of government contracts 11 and the heavy burden of the federal courts, Congress gave the fact-finding function to a specialized agency,
limiting the Courts to a perusal of the record to determine whether the
findings were supported by substantial evidence. Thus it appears that
this court's construction of the act, while remedying the disadvantage of
the bld rule, brings an equally undesirable result.
A balancing of the interests of the contracting parties lies in another
approach, which would carry out the apparent intendment of the act to
require an administrative determination prior to court action. A solution
would be to have the limitation period commence upon the occurrence of
a breach of stipulation and to regard the running of the statute as being
tolled during the administrative processing of a claim. The interest of
the contractor in acquiring timely notice of an alleged default would be
served. And the danger to the government of having a claim barred by
the running of the statute during the administrative process would be
obviated.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-DELIVERY OF PEACHES FOR

FouR YEARS
canner of

SPECIFICALLY ENFORCEABLE UNDER UNIFORM SALES ACT-A

peaches entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of grower's entire
peach crop for the seasons 1949 to 1953 inclusive. The price was to be

the average net price paid by canner to growers in the area during each
season. Grower delivered his 1949 crop, but in 1950, when peaches were
in short supply, he notified canner that he would deliver no peaches in
the future and sold his crop to a third party. Canner sought specific performance of the contract for the remainder of the term. The district court
of California, without mentioning the possibility of a remedy at law, held
that the contract was specifically enforceable under the provisions of the
California Code which embody the Uniform Sales Act.' Hunt Foods, Inc.
v. O'Disho, 98 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Cal. 1951).

In cases involving contracts for the sale of goods equity courts long
granted specific performance only on a showing that the remedy at law was
inadequate.2 However exceptions were made, the earliest being for goods
which were unique because of sentimental value.3 The Adoption of the
Uniform Sales Act, modelled after the English Sales of Goods Act,4 pro11. See 89 CoNG. REc. 10006 (1936).
1. CAI. Civ. CoDE § 1788 (1931).
2. 3 WILLISTON, SALs § 602 (Rev. ed) 1948).

3. Wilkinson v. Stitt, 175 Mass. 581, 56 N.E. 830 (1900); Pusey v. Pusey, 1

Vern. 273 (Ch. 1684).

4. 1893, 56 & 57 VIcT. c. 71, § 52.
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vided a means for liberalizing the use of specific performance. 5 Under
the Act a contract for the sale of "specific and ascertained" goods may be
specifically enforced by a court of equity "if it thinks fit." 6 The Act
fails to refer to the old test of adequacy of legal remedies, but some courts
have held that it is merely a codification of existing law,7 and no marked
change has occurred as was anticipated. The only important developnient
under the Act has been the recognition of an increasing number of factors
which necessitate specific performance under the test of adequacy of damages. Examples are the commercial significance of the goods,8 the unavailability 9 or difficulty of obtaining equivalent goods, 10 the inability of
the breaching party to pay damages,"' or the difficulty of measuring damages
which are speculative or conjectural. 12 However, the fact that American
decisions are couched in terms of the common law test of adequacy is a
barrier to making specific performance equally available with other
remedies.' 3
The instant decision is significant because it makes no mention of the
adequacy of a remedy at law.' 4 While the trend has been to get away
from the idea that damages are a sufficient remedy in cases involving the
sale of crops,' 5 and to enforce output contracts, including those for an
entire crop, the courts have been careful to point to the factors which
make the remedy of damages inadequate. 16 Thus, in Eastern Rolling Mill
5. Bomberger v. McKelvey, 35 Cal.2d 607, 220 P.2d 729 (1950); 3 WILLISTON,
§601 (1948).
6. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 68 (1906).
Pennsylvania omitted "if it thinks fit"
and substituted "if the remedy at law be inadequate." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 313
(1931).
7. E.g., Glick v. Beer, 263 App. Div. 599, 33 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1st Dep't 1942).
8. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949) (uniformity of
products made carrots a proper subject for specific performance, although it was
denied because of harshness of the contract); Curtice Brothers' Co. v. Catts, 72
N.J. Eq. 831, 66 Atl. 935 (1907).
9. DeMoss v. Conart Motor Sales, 72 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio C.P. 1947), 2 ARK.
L. REv. 461 (1946). But cf. Cohen v. Rosenstock Motors, Inc., 188 Misc. 426, 65
N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See also Oreland Co. v. Copco Corp., 310 Mich.
6, 16 N.W.2d 646 (1944).
10. Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 145 Atl. 378 (1929).
11. Pittenger Equipment Co. v. Timber Structures, Inc., 189 Ore. 1, 217 P.2d
770 (1950). Usually insolvency alone will not be deemed sufficient.
12. Morgan v. Patillo, 296 Fed. 140 (5th Cir. 1924).
13. American courts have read into the Sales Act the equity test of adequacy
of damages at law while remaining silent for the most part as to the "specific and
ascertained" provision which is set forth in the Act itself. England now leaves
SALES

specific performance to the full discretion of the court.

§ 1419 (1937).

5 WILIsToN, CoTRAcars

Continental law recognizes it as a remedy equally available with

all others rather than a supplemental one.

5 CORBIN, CONTRAcTS § 1139 (1951).

14. "Plaintiff seeks no damages, but rather seeks specific performance ..
Instant case at 269.
15. Emirzian v. Asato, 23 Cal. App. 251, 137 Pac. 1072 (3d Dist. 1913);
Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502 (1910) ; Simmons v. Williford, 60 Fla.
359, 53 So. 452 (1910).
16. Michigan Sugar Co. v. Falkenhagen, 234 Mich. 698, 220 N.W. 760 (1928).
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Co. v. Michlouitz,17 on which the present decision relies, the court enforced
a five year contract for the sale of steel scrap, but only after finding that
such scrap was unavailable elsewhere in the area. The present decision,
on the other hand, interprets the Act as authorizing specific performance
irrespective of equitable limitations and reaches a desirable result without
the support of the adequacy test. The purpose of specific performance
is to attain as fully and exactly as possible the realization of the justifiable
expectations of the promisee.' 8 While damages attempt to evaluate the
loss of a party in terms of money, and enable the purchase of equivalent
goods on the market, they do not entirely replace the performance sought
by the contract. For example, in a contract like that in the instant case, the
certainty of a steady flow of peaches from a particular orchard would be an
important element which is not compensated by dollars and cents. It
seems that enforcing performance itself best assures the expectation of
the contract as a whole.19 There is no reason why, where both parties are
able to perform, the plaintiff should not get the benefit of his contract rather
than damages based on the possibilities of conditions in the next four years.
Whether the scope of specific performance will be expanded in general remains to be seen. The possible liberalizing effect of the Sales Act
has often been stifled by reading into it the old adequacy test which, after
all, developed in a commercial climate much different from that today.
The Uniform Commercial Code embodies another attempt to free specific
performance from equitable limitations. It provides for specific performance "where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances." 20
The comment of the Commissioners specifically states that this section is
to permit a more liberal policy than most courts have followed in the past.2 '
Should the Code be adopted, its effectiveness will depend on the willingness
of the courts to participate in the proposed policy of liberalization. Assuming that this broader availability of specific performance is desirable,
there will of necessity still be a discretionary power in the courts. All
contracts do not lend themselves to specific performance, i.e., those for
personal services, those involving extensive supervision by the court, and
those which are unconscionably harsh. Also there will be cases where a
factor such as the rights of an attaching creditor may be involved, or, more
17. Supra note 10.
18. 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1138 (1951).
19. As early as 1855 the Mercantile Law Commissioners in England found the
Scottish "specific implement" superior to the English specific performance which was
only discretionary, and proposed that the laws of England and Ireland be assimilated to the laws of Scotland. Second Report of the Commissioners Appointed
to Inquire and Ascertain How Far the Mercantile Laws in the Different Parts of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland May Be Advantageously Assimilated, 354 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 10 (1855).
20. UmFORm COMMERCIAL
21. Id. at 263.

CODE

§ 2-716 (1951).
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broadly, there may be a conflict with a policy such as the alienability of
property. But a large area remains where specific performance should be
more liberally granted.

TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-UNAUTHORIZED TELECAST OF A PERFORMER'S ACT NOT AN INVASION THEREOF UNDER THE NEW YORK
STATUTE-A producer of animal acts performed his act between halves of a
professional football game before 35,000 spectators, pursuant to a contract
with Pro Football Inc., the owner of the Washington professional football
team.: Immediately before the game he learned that his act was to be
televised in conjunction with the televising of the game, and he objected.
The act was televised despite his objections. Commercial announcements
were made both prior and subsequent to the telecast of the plaintiff's act.
Plaintiff brought an action against Pro Football Inc., the program sponsor,
an advertising agency, and the American Broadcasting Company under
section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law which provides: "Any person
whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade . . . may sue and recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such use. ... ,"2 Judgment of $500
for the plaintiff was reversed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court, on the ground that the telecast was neither for advertising purposes
nor for the purposes of trade within the meaning of section 51. Gautier v.
Pro Football Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1st Dep't 1951).
The right of privacy in New York exists only to the. extent that it has
been granted by statute.3 The New York courts have reiterated the broad
language of the statute that there must be a use of the name, portrait or picture for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade.4 The term
"advertising purposes" has been defined as solicitation for patronage. 5
Recovery has been strictly limited. Unless the name, portrait or picture
appears within the physical limits of an advertisement there is no use for
advertising purposes,0 and even where the use is within paid advertising
1. The contract was a standard form contract of the American Guild of Variety
Artists, one paragraph of which contains a provision that the artist shall not be requested to appear on televesion without first securing the written consent and approval thereto of the Guild.
2. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 51.
3. Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 57 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. N.Y. 1944); Kline
v. Robert McBride & Co., 170 Misc. 974, 11 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
4. Middeton v. News Syndicate Co., 162 Misc. 516, 295 N.Y. Supp. 120 (Sup.
Ct. 1937).
5. Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
6. Jeffries v. New York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124 N.Y.
Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
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space there can be no recovery unless it is related directly to the actual
advertising of some product or business. 7 The term "for the purposes of
trade" has never been defined, but large categories have been described into
which cases are placed. If the use of the person's name, portrait or picture
can be justified as a news report or a matter of public interest, recovery
will not be granted on the ground that such a use was not for the purposes
of trade.8 However, if the news in which the use occurs is fictionalized or
dramatized in any way,9 or if it is used solely for entertainment purposes, 10
a recovery will be granted. The court in the principal case held that the
televising of the plaintiff's act was not for advertising or trade purposes
because, although neither news nor fiction, it falls within a legitimate extension of the privilege accorded to news reporting since it appeared in connection with the reporting of an event of public interest through a medium
well suited to the dissemination of news. 11
The extension to television of the privilege accorded news reporting
media is not startling under the facts of the instant case, which involved
not only an event of public interest but also a performer who in many
jurisdictions could be said to have waived his right of privacy by voluntarily appearing before a large audience.12 The significance of the case lies
first in the application of the somewhat unique New York statute, and
secondly in the involvement of television. Although the New York statute
would seem to impose a stricter test for recovery than other jurisdictions
7. Wallach v. Bachrach, 192 Misc. 979, 80 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup: Ct. 1948), aff'd,
274 App. Div. 919, 84 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1st DeI't 1948). The type of advertising involved in this case, the use of which is recently increasing, is that in which some
notable event or achievement is related in order to draw the reader's or listener's
attention to the advertisment itself.
8. E.g., Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y.
Supp. 752 (1st Dep't 1919). This case involved the use of a plaintiff's name and
picture in a newsreel depicting her engaged in work connected with the discovery of
the body of a missing person. The policy behind this immunity for anything connected with news reporting is obviously the desire not to discourage legitimate news
reporting.
9. Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
10. E.g., Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 277 N.Y. 707, 14 N.E.2d 636
(1938). A newsreel of plaintiff performing trick golf shots was incorporated
without his consent into a feature short. Evidently the medium in which the per-

son's actions are portrayed is determinative in that if it can legitimately be considered a channel of news circulation, it will be given special consideration. See
Sarat v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 782, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382, 388 (Sup. Ct. 1937),
11. Instant case at 437, 106 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
12. This would be peculiar to jurisdictions other than New York because the
only waiver that can be made under the statute is by express consent in writing.
In other jurisdictions, where a person has made his activity public he cannot later
claim a right of privacy in that activity. For example a group of performers who
staged a charity benefit show, films of which were later televised without their
consent, were held to have waived their right of privacy with regard to that show.
A California court said the proper remedy under the circumstances was an action
for breach of contract. Peterson v. K.M.T.R. Radio Corp., 18 U.S.L. WEEK 2044
(Cal. Super. July 26, 1949).

774

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

where use for advertising or trade purposes is not required, 3 it can be said
that, if any variety of trade purpose exists, New York would more readily
give recovery because of the statutory mandate. It cannot seriously be
doubted that the telecast in the instant case was for some commercial
purpose, however phrased, despite the language of the decision. The
answer may well lie in the apparent fact that, in spite of the different test
of invasion of privacy in New York, the law of that state has approached
the common law right of privacy developed in other states. Specifically,
the necessary exception of news reporting has become part of the New York
law, although printing or broadcasting news is done for the commercial
benefit of news agencies. 14 In conformity with common law jurisdictions,
this privilege is not absolute, and if news is fictionalized, sensationalized, or
dramatized in such a way as to amount to entertainment, the privilege will
not protect the publisher.' 5 Other courts place the limit of the privilege in
"decency," 16 and the limitations in New York appear to conform to the
gravamen of the invasion of privacy recognized elsewhere, namely the outrage to the plaintiff's feelings. Since the instant plaintiff's feelings could
not seriously have been outraged by the addition of a telecast to the publicity
he had already sought, the court's conclusion is in line with other jurisdictions. 17 But it is a further modification of the language of the New York
Statute.
Television already shows signs of becoming the fastest, most spontaneous, news medium. Its very nature may prevent the editing of programs to delete actionable statements and pictures as on-the-spot reporting
develops. A roving television camera increases the possibility that a face,
position, or mannerism will inadvertently appear on the screen. Whether
the courts will go no farther than giving television a privilege equal to that
accorded publications and radio, or whether they will grant it a privilege
13. Those jurisdictions in which the courts have made the original recognition
of the right do not have the commercial purpose limitation. However a large number
of the privacy litigations have involved a commercial purpose. Indicative of that
fact is that in all but two of the twelve jurisdictions in which the right of privacy
has been recognized by the highest appellate tribunal, the case of first impression
involved a use for a commercial purpose. The New York Legislature was the first
body, legislative or judicial, to recognize the right, having done so in 1902, and
when we examine what the right was thought to be at that time, their restriction to
commercial uses seem quite reasonable. Brandeis and Warren, the "inventors" of the
right, thought it would be recognized under the guise of the common law copyright
which necessarily possessed a commercial tinge. See Brandeis and Warren, The
Right of Privacy, 4 HAiV. L. Rxv. 193, 199-200 (1890).
14. See note 10 supra.
15. Sutton v. Hearst Corporation, 277 App. Div. 155, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1st
Dep't 1950). In this case the will of a soldier killed in World War II revealed the
testator to have been an ardent but secret admirer of the plaintiff, a happily married
woman, wherein he bequeathed her one rose a week. A nationally syndicated Sunday supplement carried the story in vivid detail.
16. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
17. Instant case at 438, 106 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
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commensurate with and dependent upon its attributes and peculiar nature,
is an incipient problem. The instant case renders even vaguer the line

between news and entertainment, a distinction which television itself may
be erasing. Subsequent cases may signal a significant inroad into the right
of a person to be left alone.' 8 "
18. Generally it seems that courts are going to redress only those invasions of
privacy which they have in the past. For a discussion of the particular problems in
the area of the right of privacy with which televisors will have to contend see
Boylan, Legal and Illegal Limitations on Television Programming, 11 FED. CoM.
B.J. 137, 148 (1950).

